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Abstract. There is a rapid growth in the number of applications using 
sensitive and personal information on the World Wide Web. This growth 
creates an urgent need to maintain the anonymity of the participants in many 
web transactions and to preserve the privacy of their sensitive data during 
data dissemination over the web. First, maintaining the anonymity of users  
on the World Wide Web is essential for a number of web applications. Ano-
nymity cannot be assured by single interested individuals or an organization 
but requires participation from other web nodes owned by other entities. 
Second, preserving the privacy of sensitive data is another very important  
issue in web transactions. Today, exchanging and sharing personal data be-
tween various participants in web transactions endangers privacy. In this 
article, we discuss various research directions and challenges that need to be 
addressed while trying to accomplish our goal of maintaining the anonymity 
of participants and preserving the privacy of sensitive data in web transac-
tions. To maintain anonymity of participants in a web transaction, we pro-
pose a method based on the modi fied form of the club mechanism with eco-
nomic incentives, a solution which rests upon the Prisoner’s Dilemma ap-
proach. We compare our approach to other well-known dat a-sharing ap-
proaches such as Crowds, Tor, Tarzan and LPWA. To maintain the privacy 
of sensitive data, we propose a solution based on privacy-preserving data 
dissemination (P2D2). We also present a solution to implement our ap-
proach using Semantic Web Rule Languages and Jena—a Java-based infer-
ence engine. 
1. Introduction 
Through a broad range of devices such as computers, personal digital assistants 
(PDAs), cell phones, and other web-enabled devices, the World Wide Web is now 
reaching the widest audience ever.  There is growth in the number of computer appli-
cations that use sensitive and personal information such as medical data, credit  card 
numbers, and other personally identifiable information.  This creates an urgent need 
to maintain the anonymity of the participants in web transactions and to preserve the 
privacy of their sensitive data during data dissemination over the web.  To maintain 
the anonymity of the communicating parties, we must make the source and destination 
of the data untraceable.  We can define the privacy of a party as the capability to hide 
sensitive data from entities that are not entitled to view it . 
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Maintaining the anonymity of users on the World Wide Web is essential in a num-
ber of web applications. For example, some users may want to participate in a Usenet 
discussion without revealing their identities. Some examples of such discussions in-
clude: (a) a discussion list for patients with sensitive diseases like AIDS, (b) the ex-
change of politically or socially subversive ideas, and (c) the expression of an opin-
ion, such as a comment about one’s supervisor, which may have repercussions if the 
identity of the author is revealed [Dura03]. 
Anonymity cannot be created by a single interested individual or by an organiza-
tion, but requires participation from other web nodes owned by other entities. The 
more nodes participating in the mixing of the traffic, the better the anonymity, but 
establishing and maintaining trust among a large number of nodes can be a major im-
pediment to sustaining such a framework. Each node is dependent on other nodes for 
protecting its anonymity, and hence, an appropriate economic incentive could be one 
of the solutions for managing distributed trust in such a framework [JeLB04]. 
Preserving privacy of sensitive data is another very important issue in web trans-
actions. Today, exchanging and sharing personal data between various participants in 
web transactions endangers privacy. For example, in the healthcare domain, the age 
and sex of a patient and the month of discharge from the hospital are sufficient to 
identify the patient in a limited population. Likewise, knowing two childbirth dates is 
enough to identify one woman in a sizeable population [KDTC04]. 
Typical web transactions are two-party transactions. The strength of a party in a 
transaction is defined as the capability to demand private information from another 
party and the enforcements available when the other party refuses to comply 
[JeLB04].  
To maintain anonymity of participants in a web transaction, we propose a method 
based on the modified form of the club mechanism with economic incentives 
[JeLB04], a solution which rests upon the Prisoner’s Dilemma approach. We compare 
our approach to other well-known data-sharing approaches  such as Crowds 
[ReRu97], TOR [TorO06], Tarzan [FrMo02] and Lucent Personalized Web Assistant 
(LPWA) [GGKM99]. 
To maintain the privacy of sensitive data, we propose a solution based on privacy-
preserving data dissemination (P2D2) [LiBh06]. We also present a solution to imple-
ment our approach using Semantic Web Languages and a Java-based inference engine 
supporting Semantic Web Languages. 
The rest of this article is broadly divided as follows: in Section 2, we discuss ano-
nymizing participants in web transactions in general; in Section 3, we describe pre-
serving the privacy of sensitive data in web transactions; in Section 4, we discuss 
various existing methods and our proposed solution for anonymizing participants in 
web transactions; in Section 5, we discuss our proposed solution for preserving pri-
vacy of sensitive data in web transactions, and in Section 6, we present our conclu-
sion. 
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2. Anonymizing Participants in Web Transactions 
2.1.     Introduction 
This section provides a brief explanation for the need to anonymize web transac-
tions. An analysis of traffic over the web provides valuable information about the par-
ticipants in web transactions. This information includes the IP address from which the 
participant’s geographical location can be determined. Furthermore, a lot about the 
habits of the participant can be deduced by tracking the sites she visits frequently, the 
number of messages sent or received during the day, and with whom the participant 
interacts the most on the web and at what t ime of the day she usually browses the 
web. 
Maintaining the anonymity of participants in web transactions is one of the great-
est challenges for researchers today. The failure of a commercial solution—Freedom 
Networks initiated by Zero Knowledge Systems—further raises a question about this 
scenario [JeLB04]. The designers of this network admit that the network failed be-
cause the company could not sell its services to a sufficient number of clients to cover 
its costs. 
This section describes the existing club mechanism  with economic incentives 
[JeLB04] and its drawbacks, and the alternate design approaches that we considered 
to maintain the anonymity of the participants in web transaction. 
2.2.    Club Mechanism with Economic Incentives 
In this section, we address a method to anonymize web transactions using club 
mechanism with economic incentives. The method uses an economic scheme in 
which each participant has to pay the central authority a one-time initiation fee and 
fines for misbehavior. In the model, each web transaction is considered as a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma where two players have the option of cooperating or defecting while 
maintaining each other’s anonymity. Table 1 shows the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which 
the agent can either defect (D) or cooperate (C).   
 
Table 1. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game used in the club mechanism 
with economic incentives (cf. [JeLB04]). 
                      
Let P t be the benefit  from the privacy protection received by an agent within the 
time period t. Therefore, P t is the cost of privacy violation if it  is suffered by a viola-
tion by an agent within the time period t . Also, l t is the benefit  from disclosing the 
privacy of another agent within time period t. The assumption made is that the bene-
fits gained from privacy protection are higher than the benefits received by sacrificing 
 C D 
C Pt,  Pt -Pt,   Pt + l t 
D Pt + l t,  -Pt -Pt+ l t,  -Pt + l t 
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the partner’s privacy (i.e., P t > l t). Also, both parties in the web transaction have sym-
metric privacy needs. 
The club mechanism with economic incentives consists of a Central Repository 
(CR) that randomly matches any two nodes (or club members) to perform a web 
transaction. Each club member is called an agent. During a web transaction, each 
agent has the option of either cooperating or defecting. If the original sender of the 
message feels that the intermediate agents have cheated on him by revealing his ano-
nymity, then he reports it to the CR. If the CR discovers the fraudulent agent, the 
agent has to pay a fine to the original sender of the message whose privacy has been 
violated. 
The next section describes various design approaches for anonymizing web trans-
actions. 
2.3. Alternative Designs for Anonymizing Web Transactions 
In this section, we discuss the use of our design for a bidding application. This is 
only an example since our design can be used for other web applications as well. A 
bidding system  is one in which each bidder places a bid for the product on sale, with 
the highest bidder winning the right to buy the product. Three approaches that were 
considered for the design of maintaining the anonymity of web transactions are de-
scribed next.  
2.3.1. Approach 1: Complete Dependency on a Central Repository 
Figure 1 illustrates this approach. Only one seller is shown for simplicity. In the 
case of multiple sellers, each of them must inform the central repository about the 
product they want to put up for sale. 
Any club member can be a buyer or seller. The Central Repository (CR) maintains 
a database with the ratings of each buyer and seller based on her past transactions. If 
the buyer or seller violates certain rules of the club she has to pay a fine to the CR.  
The advantages of this approach are that the seller is unaware of the identity of the 
buyer and various buyers bid for the product with their anonymity maintained. The 
architecture is not complex; however, it does have some drawbacks. 
First , there is a single point of failure, namely, the CR. The CR stores the club 
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Figure 1. Dependency on a Central Repository, indicating a single point of failure. 
Single point of  failure 
S- Seller 
B - Bidder  
CR - Central Repository    
   
 
members’ ratings and controls solely all of the web transactions. Second, a large 
amount of bandwidth would be required for the web transactions to be performed effi-
ciently. 
2.3.2. Approach 2: Reduced Dependency on a Central Repository 
The term lawyer is used to denote a club member who himself does not wish to 
bid but who bids on behalf of other club members who want to maintain anonymity 
while bidding. Figure 2 illustrates an approach in which the CR assigns a lawyer to 
each bidder. 
 In this approach, the CR assigns a lawyer to each buyer and seller (see Figure 2). 
These lawyers then perform the transaction. In the example shown in Figure 3, the 
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L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Lawyers  
randomly  
selected  
by the CR 
Figure 2. The CR is responsible for assigning a lawyer for each buyer. 
 
CR 
B1 
B2 
B3 
S 
S 
B1 
B2 
B3 
Li - lawyer for  
      the i-th bidder 
Figure 3. Once each buyer is assigned a lawyer, the CR no longer 
participates in the web transaction. 
L2 
L1 L3 
L4 
   
 
lawyer L2 knows that B1 is a bidder, and the lawyer L1 knows that S is the seller.  L2 
does not have any other information about the other participants in the web transac-
tion, i.e., the other bidders and the actual seller of the product. As shown in Figure 3, 
the CR no longer participates in the web transaction, and the anonymity of the seller 
and the bidders are still maintained. 
This approach has its advantages. First  of all, the dependency on the CR is largely 
reduced, and the amount of Internet resources is reduced compared to our previous 
approach. This is because, once the CR has assigned a lawyer to the seller and to each 
bidder, the CR no longer participates in the web transaction unless a fraud—such as a 
privacy violation by a lawyer, bidder, or seller—is reported. However, the number of 
buyers in the club for a particular product should be less than the number of lawyers. 
Note that the role of the CR cannot be ignored even though it  is reduced, and that we 
still have a single point of failure. 
2.3.3.   Approach 3: Using Opportunistic Networks  
In the above-mentioned approach, the number of bidders for a particular product 
must be less than the number of lawyers for the club mechanism to function. In this 
section, we propose a remedy to this limitation by using the approach used in oppor-
tunistic networks known as helpers [LiKG06, LKBG06]. In this approach (cf. Figure 
4), the club members using the capabilit ies of oppnets may invite other nodes (who 
become helpers) that are not a part of the club to perform the function of a lawyer. 
The new node is assigned this lawyer role only and cannot participate as a bidder. 
This approach ensures that the anonymity of the participating bidders is main-
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Figure 4.  Using opportunistic networks as lawyers.  In this approach, the number  
of lawyers in the club need not be more than the number of bidders. 
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tained.  The helpers do not have any idea about the other participating nodes and must 
leave the club once their task is done. 
2.4.   Comparison of Discussed Design Methods 
In the approaches discussed above, we rejected the Complete Dependency on a CR 
(Approach 1) and the Reduced Dependency on a CR (Approach 2) due to their de-
pendency on a CR leading to a single point of failure.  In Approach 2, even though 
the dependency is reduced, the number of lawyers must be greater than the number of 
participants in the web transaction for the club mechanism to function. By using op-
portunistic networks with helpers (Approach 3), we overcome these drawbacks. 
3.  Preserving Privacy in Web Transactions  
3.1.   Introduction  
In this section, we discuss a solution to preserve the privacy of sensitive data 
based on a scheme for privacy-preserving data dissemination [LiBh06]. The owner of 
the data is an individual, a system, or an institution. The proposed scheme ensures 
that the data shared on the web is controlled by its owner. We use the term guardian 
to describe an entity that the owner trusts with the collection, processing, storage, and 
dissemination of the sensitive data. A guardian may pass sensitive data to a subse-
quent guardian. The risks of privacy violations grow when each guardian shares this 
private data. 
Section 3.2 presents an overview of the Privacy-Preserving Data Dissemination 
(P2D2) approach. Section 3.3 describes semantic web rule languages, and Section 3.4 
describes a few design approaches that we considered for maintaining the privacy of 
sensitive data in a web transaction.  
3.2.   Privacy-Preserving Data Dissemination  
We first  need to indicate that an entity can gain a higher level of trust in the eyes 
of another entity by sharing some of its sensitive information with the other entity. As 
an example, when a person downloads a trial version of software from a software dis-
tributing website, he needs to provide sensitive information such as email address, 
home address, phone number, city and zip code. The website then sends the key for 
the software the individual downloaded to his email address. In this example, an indi-
vidual shares sensitive information with a website in order to gain its trust by estab-
lishing that he is a genuine user. 
In a web transaction, one of the interacting parties is stronger; therefore the 
weaker party may need to share private information to gain a higher level of trust. 
The stronger party may choose to share this information with other parties, thus leav-
ing the weaker party with litt le or no control over its private information. The idea 
proposed by this scheme is to bundle, or bind, this sensitive data with metadata, or 
rules, that must be followed by sharing this sensitive data. The metadata must be 
agreed upon by the owner of the sensitive data. The proposed scheme is of great im-
portance for healthcare providers, researchers, online banking systems, and for cus-
tomers and businesses who exchange sensitive information, like credit card numbers. 
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The terms “sensitive data” or “private data” may be used interchangeably. 
We now discuss the operation of the proposed scheme in a healthcare environment 
[LiBh06]. If a patient or data owner provides her health information to a nurse via an 
electronic health record (EHR) application (primary guardian), then the EHR applica-
tion obtains the patient’s privacy preferences, and creates a bundle consisting of the 
patient’s data coupled with the metadata, which includes the patient’s preferences and 
hospital’s policies. If the data are distributed further, they must include the entire bun-
dle. Passing a bundle to a subsequent guardian is permitted only if it  complies with 
the patient’s privacy preferences and hospital policies. 
If a bundle enters an environment where the conditions do not comply with those 
specified in the metadata, the contents must not be revealed. P2D2 proposes two ap-
proaches: apoptosis and adaptive evaporation. In the former, either all or no data are 
revealed. In the latter, part of the data is revealed while the rest is not. These two ap-
proaches are discussed further in Section 3.4.2. We require semantic web languages 
to define rules and other policies for data dissemination in the metadata. We must 
then parse these rules, and depending on the environmental conditions, we must be 
able to infer whether or not the data should be shared. A rule engine is required for 
this purpose.  
3.3.   Semantic Web Languages 
The Semantic Web is a mesh of information linked up in such a way as to be easily 
processable by machines on a global scale. It can be thought of as being an efficient 
way of representing data on the World Wide Web or as a globally linked database 
[Palm01]. The Semantic Web is generally built  on syntaxes that use Uniform Re-
source Identifiers (URIs) to represent data. A URI is a web identifier, like the strings 
starting with “http:” or “ftp:” [Palm01]. The Resource Description Framework (RDF) 
utilizes three URIs to represent data on the web. Once information is in the RDF 
form, it  becomes easy to machine-process it , since RDF is a generic format and has 
many existing parsers. 
When information needs to be processed (as opposed to situations in which the 
content only needs to be presented), we need a language to represent the meaning of 
terms in vocabularies and the relationships between those terms. This representation 
of terms and their interrelationships is called ontology [McFr04]. The OWL Web On-
tology Language is used in situations in which data need to be processed automati-
cally, such as in P2D2.  In P2D2, we need to include some rules, defined by the 
owner of the data and the guardians. The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) can 
be used for defining such rules. We also require a rule-based inference engine that can 
infer whether or not the data must be shared, given the metadata and current environ-
mental conditions. We decided to use Jena as this engine. Jena is a Java framework 
for building Semantic Web applications.  
3.4.   Solutions for Anonymizing Participants in Web Transactions   
Two approaches that were considered for maintaining the privacy of sensitive data 
in web transactions are described next. The terms rules and conditions are used inter-
changeably.  
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3.4.1. Approach 1: No Bundling of Data and Metadata 
This section describes an approach in which the data and metadata are not bundled 
together. At each stage, the intermediate guardians must make sure that the data are 
shared conforming to the metadata. Figure 5 shows how the data are disseminated 
from the owner (O) to the primary, secondary, and tertiary guardians. 
Characteristics of an approach in which data and metadata are not bundled to-
gether can be described as follows: 
1. The owner specifies some conditions that must be met before the PG disseminates 
the owner’s data to a secondary guardian. 
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tions plus  restrictions  of 
 O PG 
Owner hands over data to primary 
guardian with certain condit ions 
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PG disseminates data to SG 
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Con(O) + Con(PG) 
 
TG-1 
Figure 5. Sharing of data between guardians. 
O - Owner 
PG - Primary Guardian 
SG - Secondary Guardian 
TG - Tertiary Guardian 
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Data + Metadata 
(rules) 
 
PG  O 
Data + Metadata   
(rules) 
Figure 6. Dissemination of data and metadata among guardians. 
O - Owner 
PG - Primary Guardian 
SG - Secondary Guardian 
 
   
 
2. It  is then the responsibility of the PG to check whether the SG is a legitimate user 
or not. 
3. The PG adds its own conditions before permitting data transfer, which, coupled 
with the conditions posed by the owner, must be met by the SG. 
4. The cycle continues, with the SG then adding its own conditions, along with 
those of the O and the PG, before passing information to a TG. 
5. Note that, before passing the data to the next guardian, at  each interface certain 
conditions have to be checked. 
A question that arises is: how do we trust these guardians? The approach discussed 
next bundles metadata and data so that we do not depend on a guardian for preserving 
privacy in data dissemination. 
3.4.2.   Approach 2: Bundling Data and Metadata 
In this approach, we combine data and metadata into a single bundle. Figure 6 
shows how this is done. An inference engine is used to decide whether the bundle can 
be shared or not. Metadata has to be coded in a Semantic Web standard so that it  can 
be parsed by the inference engine. 
Characteristics of the approach in which the data and metadata are bundled to-
gether can be described as follows: 
1.  In this approach, we do not need to depend on the intermediate guardians to 
check whether the conditions stated by the owner are met or not. 
2.  The PG, SG, etc., do not add their own conditions but simply transfer data 
when asked for them. 
3.  The data itself contain software that checks for certain conditions that must 
be checked before allowing the user to access it. 
4.  The data must be encrypted. 
In the approaches discussed above, we specify ways in which the rules/conditions 
in the metadata must be verified before sharing the data. However, if these rules/
conditions are not met, either part or the entire data must not be disseminated. We 
discuss two mechanisms to prevent the dissemination of sensitive data in web transac-
tions that do not satisfy the rules/conditions in the metadata. These are apoptosis and 
adaptive evaporation. 
A.   Apoptosis 
A bundle about to be compromised chooses apoptosis over risking a privacy dis-
closure. In this approach, apoptosis destroys both data and metadata to prevent infer-
ences from metadata. The apoptosis mechanism  within a bundle can be implemented 
as a set of detectors setting off the associated apoptosis code. The code is activated 
when detectors determine a credible threat of a successful attack on the bundle by any 
host. Detectors find the bundle’s trust level for a host based on information from mul-
tiple sources. These sources include a reputation databases, a source guardian’s first-
hand experience, and its second-hand opinions obtained from neighbors [LiBh06]. 
A detector in a bundle scheduled to arrive at a host with a trust level below a cer-
tain threshold will discover danger and will trigger apoptosis. There are different 
apoptosis threshold levels for hosts with different access permissions to private data. 
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For example, higher trust levels are usually expected of the patient’s home clinic than 
from a clinic visited by a vacationing patient [LiBh06]. 
Figure 7 illustrates the mechanism of apoptosis in which the bundle self-destructs 
once the threshold limit for the threat level is reached. At the moment when apoptosis 
occurs, the bundle content goes from 100% to 0%. 
B.   Adaptive Evaporation  
Perfect passing of bundles is not always desirable. If bundles can be captured by 
attackers, their owners want to see their data evaporated partially (e.g., have them de-
identified) with the most sensitive data evaporating first . The more threatening the 
environment, the larger the portion of the bundle that evaporates. To prevent infer-
ences from metadata, all metadata evaporate in step with the associated data and in a 
manner that does not compromise data privacy in any other way. For instance, an 
owner’s preferences for the owner’s data never evaporate earlier than the data they 
protect [LiBh06]. Figure 8 illustrates this mechanism. 
A number of different metrics were considered for the adaptive control of the 
evaporation. First , the trust level can be obtained—as discussed for apoptosis—and 
used to control the required degree of evaporation. Second, in some environments, 
trust is directly proportional to the physical distance from the data owner. Third, dis-
tance can be defined in a more sophisticated way, such as in terms of data dissemina-
tion hops [LiBh06]. 
Instances of data evaporation include replacing exact data with approximate data, 
or up-to-date values with outdated values. Evaporation can be applied to images as 
well. For example, a close-up photo of a person can be replaced with a distant whole-
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body photo [LiBh06]. 
Apoptosis can be considered a special case of adaptive evaporation, which follows 
a step function with a constant minimum value (no evaporation) initially and the 
maximum value (complete evaporation) above a certain threshold. 
4.   Solution for Anonymizing Participants in Web Transactions  
In this section we discuss existing systems providing anonymity to users. We ana-
lyze them for methods, algorithms, or protocols that will be useful for providing an 
optimal solution to maintain anonymity of the participants during a web transaction. 
We first  discuss methods available in current research and publications before putting 
forward our proposed solution. 
4.1.   Analysis of Existing Methods 
In this section we discuss existing systems that are useful for maintaining partici-
pant anonymity in web transactions.  
4.1.1  Tor 
The primary goal of Tor [TorO06] is to prevent traffic analysis. This means that an 
attacker should not be able to trace the originator and the destination of a message if 
she intercepts a part of the message. The Internet data packet consists of a header that 
carries control information and the data payload. The data payload can be encrypted, 
but the header can reveal important information such as the data source, destination, 
and the size of the data. The identity of the sender can be revealed to an attacker 
through this packet header, hence forcing the sender to lose his anonymity. Encryp-
tion will not help prevent traffic analysis as we can only encrypt the data payload.  
 The design concept used by Tor is similar to using a convoluted, hard-to-follow 
route in order to throw off a pursuer, and then periodically erasing one’s footprints. 
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Figure 9a. Step 1 of Tor operation: Alice’s Tor 
client obtains a list of Tor nodes from the directory 
server Dave (cf. (TorO06]). Tor nodes are shown 
as computers with black screens. The dotted-line 
arrow represents a non-encrypted link. 
Figure 9b. Step 2 of Tor operation: Alice’s Tor 
client picks a random path to the destination server 
Bob. Solid arrows represent encrypted links, and 
dotted-line arrows represent non-encrypted links 
(cf. [TorO06]).  
   
 
Instead of taking a direct route from source to the destination, the data packets on the 
Tor network take a random pathway through several servers that cover their tracks so 
no observer at any single point can tell where the data came from or where they are 
going. 
To create a private network pathway with Tor, the user’s software or client incre-
mentally builds a circuit  of encrypted connections through servers on the network. 
This is shown in Figure 9a, in which Alice’s Tor client obtains a list  of Tor nodes 
from the directory server Dave.  Since the circuit  is incremented one hop at a t ime, 
and each server along the way knows only the server that gave it data and the server 
to which it  is giving data, no individual server ever knows the complete path that a 
data packet has taken. At each hop, the client uses a separate set of encryption keys to 
ensure that each hop cannot trace these connections as they pass through. 
Once a circuit  has been established, many kinds of data can be exchanged and sev-
eral different sorts of software applications can be deployed over the Tor network. 
Since each server sees no more than a single hop in the circuit , it  is impossible for an 
eavesdropper to use traffic analysis to link the connection’s source and destination. 
Figure 9b shows how Alice’s Tor client communicates with the server Bob. In Figure 
9c, Alice’s Tor client communicates with a different server, Jane, using a different 
path. Note that in Figures 9a through 9c the Tor nodes (shown as computers with 
black screens) in the private network selected by Alice’s Tor client remain the same, 
though the path taken is different. 
4.1.2.   LPWA—Lucent Personalized Web Assistant  
The LPWA [LPWA00] is a tool that is used for personalized services on the web.  
Personalized web services are web pages that are tailored to the individual user. An 
example is a personalized news webpage, where a user specifies the type of news arti-
cles of interest to the user and the website displays only such articles. To achieve this, 
the website requires the user to create an account first so that it can store the prefer-
ences and associate them with a particular user. The drawback to this approach is that 
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these user accounts may be used by other parties as a means of deducing the user’s 
browsing habits. Other user information (including the user’s current location) can be 
made available to the websites due to the nature of the HTTP protocol and the cookie 
mechanism. Many websites also send junk email based on the browsing preferences 
of the users. Thus, there is a need to provide a service that can prevent users from be-
ing “recognized” when they return to their user accounts. Further, this will help in 
reducing  junk email, a fast growing nuisance for web users. 
The LPWA system consists of 3 parts: a Persona generator, a browsing proxy, and 
an email forwarder. The Persona generator consists of the Janus function designed to 
support pseudonyms. The LPWA email forwarder creates an alias address for a user 
when the user provides the @ escape sequence. As a part of the persona generator, a 
user obtains a different and seemingly unrelated alias email address for each website 
for which he is registered. For example, a user might be known as abcd007@ 
lpwa.com at www.example.com and as gobroncos@lpwa.com at www.cnn.com. 
Whenever the email forwarder decrypts an alias email address in order to forward a 
message to a user’s real email address, it includes the alias email address in the CC 
email header. If example.com is sold to spammers, the user can use a mail filter for 
the alias abcd007 and thus eliminate all emails received from these spammers; at the 
same time email messages from other sites are unaffected.    
4.1.3.   Crowds  
A web server can record information about users who visit  it . These data include 
the IP address and thus the user’s domain and workplace and her approximate loca-
tion. Some web servers can link multiple sessions by the same user by planting a 
unique cookie in the user’s browser. Thus, even if the user changes his/her location 
and visits the web site from different IP addresses, the web server can track the user’s 
whereabouts. Most importantly, the same monitoring capabilit ies are made available 
to other parties as well (besides the web server). These include the user’s Internet Ser-
vice Provider (ISP) or the local gateway administrator who can observe all communi-
cation in which the user participates. Crowds [ReRu97] is a system that enables re-
trieval of information over the web without revealing any private data of the parties. 
The primary goal of Crowds is to increase the anonymity of the users on the web and 
make web browsing anonymous. 
 
The basic idea behind Crowds is to hide the actions of a user within the actions of 
many others. To execute a web transaction the user needs to join a crowd. The user’s 
request to a web server is then passed to a random member in the crowd. That mem-
ber can either commit  or forward it  to another randomly chosen member. When the 
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request is eventually submitted, it  is submitted by a random member. Even the crowd 
members cannot identify the initiator of the request. There are several degrees of ano-
nymity provided by crowds as shown in Figure 10.  The degree of anonymity de-
creases as we move towards the right. 
We need to explain a few degrees of anonymity named in Figure 10. The degree 
beyond suspicion indicates that the sender’s (can be extended to receiver’s) identity is 
beyond suspicion even if the attacker accesses the sent message. The chances that the 
sender is the originator of the message are no more than any other member in the 
crowd. The degree probable innocence indicates that the sender appears to be the 
likely originator of the message as much as he is unlikely to be the originator. Here, 
the attacker may have a reason to expect that the sender is the originator; however, it 
appears to him at least as likely that the sender is not the originator. The degree possi-
ble innocence indicates that a sender is possibly innocent if, from the attacker’s point 
of view, there is a nontrivial probability that the originator is someone else. An ad-
vantage of Crowds is that each user actively participates in the function of the crowd, 
hence increasing the throughput. Also, if a new member joins the crowd, the load on 
each user’s computer in the crowd remains roughly constant. However, in the mix, 
the load of each server increases proportionally with the number of users, hence de-
creasing the throughput. 
A user is represented in the crowd by a process called a jondo (the term is derived 
from “John Doe,” a synonym for an anonymous person). The user then contacts the 
server, called a blender, to request admittance into the crowd. The blender then re-
ports to this jondo the current membership of the crowd and the information that en-
ables the jondo to participate in the crowd. The function of the blender is to put a re-
questing user into the crowd, and is not needed later. The request is issued by the 
browser, forwarded through a number of jondos, and eventually submitted to the end 
server. The sequence of jondos that a request traverses is called a path. An important 
feature of the Crowds protocol is that the request is sent in the same form along each 
“hop” of the path, so that each jondo cannot tell whether its predecessor initiated the 
request or is just forwarding it  from another jondo. The server’s reply to the request is 
usually a web page which is sent backwards through the same path. Subsequent re-
quests initiated by the same jondo follow the same path through the crowd, even if 
these requests are targeted for different web servers. That is, once established, a path 
remains static as long as possible unless a jondo on a path fails or new jondos are 
added. In these cases, the paths of all jondos are forgotten and rerouted from scratch.  
4.1.4.   Tarzan 
Tarzan [FrMo02] is a peer-to-peer anonymous IP network overlay. It  achieves its 
anonymity with layered encryption and multi-hop routing. A message initiator 
chooses a path of peers randomly through a restricted topology in a way that adver-
saries cannot easily influence. Its goal is to allow a host to communicate with an arbi-
trary server in such a manner that nobody can determine the host’s identity. 
Consider a host H that sends a message to a server through a proxy, such as Ano-
nymizer.com. This system fails if the proxy reveals a user’s identity or if an adversary 
can observe the proxy’s traffic. Typically Tarzan works as a three step process. First , 
a node running an application that desires anonymity selects a set of nodes to for a 
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path through the overlay network. Next, this source-routing node establishes a tunnel 
using these nodes, which includes distribution of session keys. Finally, it routes data 
packets through this tunnel. The exit  point of the tunnel is a Network Address Trans-
lator (NAT). This NAT forwards the anonymized packets to servers that are not 
aware of Tarzan, and it receives a response from the servers and reroutes the packets 
via this tunnel. 
A Tarzan tunnel passes two distinct types of messages between nodes:  data pack-
ets and control packets. A flow tag uniquely identifies each link of each tunnel. A 
relay rapidly determines how to route a packet tag. 
A tunnel setup in Tarzan is done as follows. The sender pseudo-randomly selects a 
series of nodes from the network based on its local topology. The tunnel fails if one 
of its relays stops forwarding packets. To overcome this, the initiator sends ping mes-
sages to the PNAT (server-side Pseudonymous Network Address Translator) through 
the tunnel and waits for acknowledgements. The initiator will then have to determine 
the point of failure, if it  does not receive a response. Tarzan uses a simple gossip-
based protocol for peer discovery. A node can prune inactive neighbors when they do 
not respond to cover traffic establishment requests. Once peers are discovered, peer 
selection uses a three level hierarchy: first  among all /16 subnets, then among /24 
subnets belonging to this 16-bit IP address, then among the relevant IP addresses. 
(The /n subnet of a network is the subnet with addresses determined by the last n bits 
of the mask.) The originator node will then request the selected peer to exchange bi-
directional mimic data with it . 
4.2.   Proposed Design for Maintaining Anonymity of Participants in Web  
Transactions 
In this section we propose a method to maintain the anonymity of participants in 
web transactions using a modified form of the club mechanism with economic incen-
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tives [JeLB04], as shown in Figure 11a. 
The CR is comprised of a group of elite agents known as super agents as shown in 
Figure 11b. The entire club is subdivided into sections and each super agent is as-
signed one sub section.  A super agent is a club member who can be nominated based 
on factors such as availability and internet connection speed. If one super agent fails, 
only the agents under it  would not be able to participate in the web transactions taking 
place within the club, whereas all other agents not under it  could still participate. The 
super agents themselves will decide on the initiation fee and the fines for violating 
agents. Note that one super agent need not inform the other super agents about the 
random agents chosen for the web transactions. 
In Figure 11b, we have considered the CR comprised of five super agents. This is 
just an example, and the number of super agents may vary depending on factors such 
as the number of agents in the club. The super agents can invite not only club mem-
bers but, in special cases, also non-members. The special cases arise when the number 
of club agents participating in a web transaction exceeds the number of those who do 
not. In this case, the super agents can invite nodes from outside the club to perform 
the roles of anonymizing agents or lawyers. These opportunistic nodes (or helpers) 
are invited only for a particular task, after which they must leave the club. The super 
nodes may even decide to use more than two lawyers to carry out a web transaction, 
further increasing the anonymity of the sender and buyer. 
4.3.   Comparison of  Proposed and Analyzed Methods  
Table 2 below provides a comparison of the club mechanism with economic in-
centives, Tor, Crowds and Tarzan. Tor and Tarzan have a single point of failure, that 
is, if the primary server goes down, the entire system fails and hence these are de-
pendent entirely on the primary server. In the club mechanism with economic incen-
tives, if one of the super agent servers goes down, only the agents that were depend-
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ent on this super agent will suffer, leaving the other agents active. Load balancing is 
thus not possible in Tor and Tarzan due to the nature of their architecture, i.e., de-
pendency on a single server. 
Anonymity of senders and receivers is one of the goals of the club mechanism 
with economic incentives. Crowds, Tor and Tarzan may provide sender anonymity 
whereas Crowds also provides receiver anonymity. Payload encryption may be done 
in the club mechanism with economic incentives if desired. When packets are to be 
forwarded, the intermediate nodes may decide to send the packets or not. In the club 
mechanism, the agents do have this option, with economic incentives at stake if they 
do forward them. The Crowds mechanism has an option in which jondos may choose 
not to forward packets if they wish. Finally, in the club mechanism with economic 
incentives, the route that a message takes is decided by the super agents. In the cases 
of Tor and Tarzan, the route is determined by the sender. In Crowds, the route taken 
by the message is performed dynamically. 
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Club mecha-
nism with 
economic 
incentives 
Tor Crowds Tarzan LPWA 
Single point  
of failure No 
Yes - direc-
tory-based 
approach 
No Yes NA 
Memory usage Low High Low High NA 
Switching Packet Circuit Packet Circuit NA 
Load balancing Possible 
Not possible -
dedicated 
tunnel set up 
Possible Not  possible NA 
Scaling complexity O(1) O(n) O(1) O(n) NA 
Sender anonymity Yes Maybe Maybe Maybe Yes 
Receiver  
anonymity Yes No Yes No Yes 
Payload  
encryption of 
packet from 
sender 
Maybe No Maybe No No 
Payload  
encryption in  
receiver's response 
Maybe No Maybe No No 
Intermediate nodes 
decide on packet 
forwarding? 
Yes No Yes No No 
Route selection 
By controller 
(as a set of 
super agents) 
By sender Dyna-
mic 
By 
sender NA 
Table 2. Comparison of technologies discussed in the design  
for maintaining anonymity of the participants 
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5. Solutions for Privacy--Preserving Dissemination of  Sensi-
tive Data in Web Transactions  
In this section, we discuss a solution to preserve the privacy of sensitive data in 
web transactions. In a web transaction one of the involved participants is stronger 
than the other, therefore participants must agree on a set of rules or policies in order 
to interact successfully. This means that they need to negotiate before starting a web 
transaction [Ande04]. 
The data and metadata (consisting of rules) are bundled and treated as an atomic 
unit . A web rule language is used to define the rules that must be adhered to while 
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sharing data in such web transactions. The Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) is 
one such option and we describe it  briefly. 
5.1. SWRL– Semantic Web Rule Language 
In this section we will describe SWRL [HPBT04], a web standard used to define 
rules on the web. SWRL enables to combine Horn-like rules (in the form of an impli-
cation, as shown below) with an OWL knowledge base. The rules in SWRL are stated 
as follows: axiom::= rule. A human readable syntax of the rules is shown as an impli-
cation: head => body. Rules with an empty head (or antecedent) and non-empty body 
(or consequent) are used to provide unconditional facts. The head and the body may 
have zero or more atoms (indivisible elements).          Atoms can be of the forms C(x), 
P(x, y), sameAs(x, y), etc., where  C is an OWL description, P is an OWL property, 
and x and y are either variables, OWL individuals or OWL data values. The non-
terminals are shown in bold and not quoted. 
In our solution, rules are specified by the owner of the data. If these rules are not 
satisfied, the data should be disseminated only partially (e.g., without the most sensi-
tive data) or not disseminated at all. SWRL requires a rule engine for its execution. 
Based on the rules and the current data, the work of the rule engine is to infer whether 
or not the data must be disseminated. A structure of a rule engine is shown in Figures 
12a and 12b. 
Figure 12a shows a combination of rules, instances and classes. The rules are 
those defined by the owner of the sensitive data and are included in the metadata. The 
instances refer to the current conditions, and the classes belong to the ontology being 
used. Figure 12b shows how an inference engine is used to deduce new facts, given 
the current facts and rules. 
Jena is one rule engine that supports SWRL. It is a Java-based framework. Based 
on the inferences made by the rule engine, a decision as to whether or not the data is 
shared further must be made; if any data is shared, a decision how much of the data 
must be hidden is needed as well.  
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5.2.   Jena – Rule Engine Supporting SWRL and Other Web-Rule                             
Languages  
Jena is a Java framework for building semantic web applications [Reyn06]. RDF 
(Resource Description Framework) is a web standard for describing resources 
[McCa04]. A resource is simply something that can be identified. For example, a uni-
versity can be identified by its address, telephone number, etc. The Resource Descrip-
tion Framework has now become a W3C recommendation, joining other important 
Web standards such as XML and SOAP [McCa04]. Consider the example in which 
John Smith is identified by his visiting card, a VCard. Figure 13 represents this dia-
grammatically. 
 The resource is John Smith and he is identified by a URI (Uniform Resource 
Identifier). Resources have properties, one of which is his full name on the VCard. 
The part before the “ :” is called the namespace prefix and represents a namespace. 
The part after the “ :” is called a local name and represents a name in that namespace. 
Each property has a value. In this case the value is a literal.  
5.2.1. Inference Support in Jena  
In this section, we describe the inference support provided by Jena. Figure 14 de-
scribes the architecture of the Inference Model used by Jena [Reyn06]. 
 First , we need to create a model consisting of the rules, the data and ontology. 
There are five different reasoners in Java that can be used. One of them has to be se-
lected from the reasoner registry, as shown in Figure 14. Once the reasoner has been 
selected, we need to provide it  with the ontology definitions/rules and the data/facts. 
The reasoner then creates an inference graph based on this input. Second, a Java API 
is used to query for information from this inference graph. Third, based on the results 
from the inference graph, we can then decide whether or not the data is to be shared. 
We now provide a simple example (adapted from [Reyn06]) of Java code showing 
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rules written in Jena, and the inferences resulting from the rules. Suppose that prop-
erty “p” is a sub-property of another property “q” and there is a resource “a” with a 
value “hi” for “p”. Comments are bracketed by /* and */. The rest is Java code. 
 
Jena code: 
String NS = "urn:x-hp-jena:eg/"; 
 /* Build a trivial example data set */ 
 Model rdfsExample = ModelFactory.createDefaultModel(); 
 /* Initialize two properties: p and q */ 
 Property p = rdfsExample.createProperty(NS, "p"); 
 Property q = rdfsExample.createProperty(NS, "q"); 
 /* Add the rule: p is a sub property of q */ 
 rdfsExample.add(p, RDFS.subPropertyOf, q); 
 /* Create a resource A with the property p having the value hi */ 
 rdfsExample.createResource(NS+"a").addProperty(p, "hi"); 
/* Create an inference model */ 
InfModel inf = ModelFactory.createRDFSModel(rdfsExample);   
/* The resulting model shows that “ a” also has property “q” of 
value “ hi” by virtue of  subPropertyOf  entailment. */ 
Resource a = inf.getResource(NS+"a"); 
System.out.println("Statement: " + a.getProperty(q)); 
 
Output showing that the resource “ a” has a property “ q” using the sub-property en-
tailment: 
Statement: [urn:x-hp-j ena:eg/a, urn:x-hp-jena:eg/q, Literal] 
The above code is trivial and by no means reflects the power of the inference en-
gine. However, it  does give an idea about the basic steps that lead to creating an infer-
ence model and querying it. 
6. Conclusion 
We have discussed schemes to maintain anonymity and privacy of participants in 
web transactions. We have proposed a modified form of the club mechanism with 
economic incentives. The concept of having super agents as part of the Central Re-
pository makes the existing club mechanism far more distributed. We have also pro-
posed the use of opportunistic networks in playing the role of lawyers (members’ 
agents) in the club mechanism. In this way, the number of club members participating 
in one particular web transaction can exceed the number of potential lawyers (i.e., 
club members who do not need to participate in that web transaction). Further, there 
is no single point of failure; if a super agent fails, only the agents in the network con-
trolled by it  will  be  unable to participate in web transactions, whereas the rest of the 
network functions normally. 
We have compared existing systems that provide participant anonymity in web 
transactions to the modified club mechanism with economic incentives. We discussed 
the advantages and drawbacks of the systems and have presented reasons as to why 
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this club mechanism is the best choice. The lack of understanding of incentives for 
encouraging group cooperation is a major drawback in systems other than the club 
mechanism with economic incentives [JeLB04]. 
We discussed privacy-preserving data dissemination (P2D2) to maintain privacy 
of data in a web transaction. Typically, in any web transaction, one of the participants 
is always stronger than the other (in terms of the power to ask the other party for sen-
sitive data). Dissemination of sensitive data owned by the weaker partner must be 
controlled. The proposed scheme for privacy-preserving data dissemination enables 
control of data by their owner [LiBh06]. This is accomplished by combining data and 
metadata into a bundle and then disseminating the entire bundle. 
We discussed the use of semantic web languages to represent metadata. Metadata 
include a set of rules defined by the owner of the data. An inference engine is needed 
to control bundles as dictated by the rules within metadata. Based on the facts, e.g., 
the transaction participant identity to whom the data is being shared and the metadata, 
the inference engine deduces whether or not any data in the bundle can be disclosed.  
If some data can be disclosed, the inference engine must decide how much of the data 
can be disclosed. 
We presented an overview of an inference engine named Jena, which is a Java 
framework for building and querying inference models in semantic web applications. 
We described a simple inference made by Jena. We feel that Jena will provide a 
strong option for implementing the P2D2 mechanism in the future. 
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